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INTRODUCTION
Midway through the oral argument in NLRB v. Noel Canning, it became clear that
the governments positionauthorizing the President to make recess appointments
during pro forma sessions of the Senate1hinged largely on a formality. A pro forma
session qualifies as a recess, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., argued, as long
as the Senate dispatches an order declaring that it shall conduct no business.2 In Noel
Canning, the dispatch of such an order was undisputed: so President Obamas recess
appointments to the NLRB were constitutional.3
In response to Verrillis argument, Chief Justice Roberts offered a simple but
pointed hypothetical: What if, instead of saying No business shall be conducted, the
order said, It is not anticipated that any business will be conducted. [Would] that suf-
fice to eliminate that period as a recess?4 A colloquy ensued:
* VisitingFellow, InformationSocietyProject, Yale LawSchool. For helpfulconversations,
I amgrateful to the participants in the 2014 legal scholarship reading group, and most especially
BJ Ard. I am also grateful to Jack Balkin, Paul Kahn, and Kara Lowentheil, for helpful con-
versations about the Article, and to the editors of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
who improved things immeasurably. Finally, the Article drew inspiration from the work of the
scholarwhofirst introduced me to constitutional law: RevaSiegel. Errors aremyfault, of course.
1 See, e.g., Reply Brief of Petitioner at 2025, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550
(2014) (No. 12-1281) (arguing, broadly, that [t]he Senate [i]s [i]n [r]ecess [u]nder [t]he Recess
Appointments Clause [w]hen [i]ts [o]rder [p]rovides [t]hat, [f]or 20 [d]ays, [i]t [w]ill [h]old
[o]nly [f]leeting [p]ro [f]orma [s]essions [a]t [w]hich [n]o [b]usiness [i]s [t]o [b]e [c]on-
ducted); see also Nicole Schwartzberg, What is a Recess?: Recess Appointments and the
Framers Understanding of Advice and Consent, 28 J.L.&POL. 231 (2013) (exploring what the
increasing prevalence of pro forma recesses means for constitutional structure).
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (No. 12-1281).
3 134 S. Ct. at 2550.
4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (No. 12-1281).
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GENERAL VERRILLI: I think that its athats a different case
and I think, concededly, a significantly harder case for the Execu-
tive because here
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah. Well, its difficult and harder,
but it also suggests that youre just talking about a couple of magic
words that the Senate can just change at the drop of a hat. So
maybe the point is not that significant.
GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I think it is significant, Mr. Chief
Justice. Its a formal action by the Senate by rule saying that no
business shall be conducted.5
No surprise that General Verrilli found significan[ce] in the Senates formal
action.6 Formality was the essence of the governments position. At the same time,
Robertss question captures a widespread intuition. Constitutional boundaries should
not depend on how state actions are named. They should depend on what state actions
actually consist of. Hence his pejorative use of the word magic: to focus on labels
rather than substance is to be taken in by an illusion.
This logic may sound familiar. In fact, it is the same logic that Chief Justice
Roberts offered three terms ago, in NFIB v. Sebelius, to justify upholding the indi-
vidual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).7 His argument? That in spite of
Congresss decision to call the ACAs levy for non-compliance with the individual
mandate a penalty, the levy operated, in practice, as a tax.8 And for the purpose of
deciding if the ACA was a legitimate exercise of Article I power, what mattered was
how the levy worked, not how lawmakers happened to describe it.9 To hold the oppo-
site, Roberts wrote, would make the meaning of Article I hinge on whether Congress
5 Id. at 1213. In his opinion for the Court in Noel Canning, Justice Breyer picks up on this
thread of skepticism. Responding to the argument that the nature of the Senates convening
is dictated by formal orders, Breyer writes: the Senates rules make clear that during its pro
forma sessions, despite its resolution that it would conduct no business, the Senate retained
the power to conduct business. During any pro forma session, the Senate could have con-
ducted business simply by passing a unanimous consent agreement. Noel Canning, 134 S.
Ct. at 2555. In other words, regardless of how the Senate refers to its power during pro forma
sessions, the nature of that power is undisputed: the Senate has the functional ability to con-
duct business, notwithstanding its formal order. See also Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis:
Pragmatism Triumphs Over Formalism, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014 12:56 PM), http://www
.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-analysis-pragmatism-triumphs-over-formalism/ (describing
Noel Canning as a decision grounded in constitutional pragmatism).
6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (No. 12-1281).
7 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
8 Id. at 2594.
9 Id. at 259596.
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used the wrong labels.10 It would let magic words . . . disable an otherwise consti-
tutional [enactment].11
Behind the political fireworks of NFIB, interpretive questions loom unresolved.
What role do labels play in legal analysis? What role should they play?
Broadly speaking, this Article has two goals. The first is to demonstrate the promi-
nence of functionalism in the interpretive practices of the Supreme Court. Reading a
case like NFIB, it would be easy to conclude that the tension between labels and func-
tion reflects a deep rift in our legal order. On reflection, though, the rift turns out to
be something of a mirage. While judicial opinions do occasionally employ the rhetoric
of label-formalism, we are all functionalists at heart.
The Articles second goal is to explore two exceptions to this norm. One is a faux
exceptionan exception to functionalism that actually reinforces its primacy. The
second is a genuine exception, though very possibly a lamentable one.
The faux exception is the use of clear statement rules. In some domains, the Court
has held that draftersbe they legislative bodies drafting statutes, or private parties
drafting contractsmust use precise language when directing outcomes of an especially
momentous or disruptive nature.12 By imposing this requirement, clear statement rules
tether interpretation to labels: they disable courts from looking beyond the words that
drafters use. Clear statement rules are thus designed to shut down the interpretive enter-
prise. And in that sense, although clear statement rules call for label-formalism, they
actually underscore the primacy of functionalism. The existence of clear statement
rulesthat they are necessary in the first instancesuggests that when judges are
left to their own devices, they focus on function, not labels.
The second exception to functionalisma real one, though not necessarily a wise
oneis a specific doctrinal setting: race equality jurisprudence. There, the focus is
often on labels, not function, because the labels in questionracial categoriesare
understood to workfreestandingharm.When confronting race equalitycases, the Court
does ascribe magical power to labels, but it is a destructive kind of magical power: laws
that employ racial labels are ipso facto suspect, no matter their operation or under-
lying purpose.13 Drawing on Reva Siegels work, I argue that the Courts aversion to
racial labels is divisible into two conceptually distinct views.14 From one viewthe
color-blindness viewall race-conscious lawmaking is suspect, and the presence
of racial labels is troubling simply because it evinces race-consciousness.15 From the
10 Id. at 2597.
11 Id. at 2595 (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992)).
12 See infra notes 8789.
13 Of course, a law mayon some conceptions of equal protectionbe redeemed from
the stigma of racial labels because of its purpose or operation. But the doctrine focuses, in
the first instance, on the presence of racial labels; that is the first step in the progression of
strict scrutiny analysis. See Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Anti-Balkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 128889 (2011).
14 See id. at 1281.
15 See id.
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other viewthe anti-balkanization viewracial labels are intrinsically problematic.16
The Constitution doesnot necessarilyfrown on laws that pursue race-related objectives,
but it does frown on the use of racial labels to further those objectives.17
The Article closes on a normative note. I argue that the anti-balkanization view,
by transforming racial labels as a source of taboo, clashes with functionalist inter-
pretation. If the anti-balkanization view can be reconciled with our practices, it is
because racial labels are genuinely exceptionalbecause, in light of our history,
they really do have negative magic power. I conclude by expressing skepticism about
this proposition.
Part I revisits NFIB to introduce the problem. Part II demonstrates the primacy of
functionalist interpretation. Part III explainsand ultimately explains awayclear
statement rules. Part IV takes up race equality jurisprudence. The last Part concludes.
I. NFIB
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) prompts individuals with a choice, couched as a
mandate: buy health insurance or pay a levy.18 The constitutional status of the Act
hinged on whether the levy is best characterized as a penalty or a tax. Construe the
levy as a penalty, and the ACA runs afoul of the Commerce Clause.19 Construe it as
a tax, and the Act becomes a legitimate exercise of congressional power under the
Taxing and Spending Clause.20
This question provoked fierce disagreement. Partly, of course, this had to do with
the cases obvious political stakes. Beneath the surface, however, lurk deep interpre-
tive questions. Writing for the Court in NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts articu-
lated the importance of focusing on substance, not labels, in constitutional analysis.21
The idea is intuitive: when assessing constitutional boundaries, the controlling vari-
ables should be how laws actually operate, not how laws describe how they operate.
Roberts furnished an example to gloss the point:
Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every tax-
payer who owns a house without energy efficient windows must
pay $50 to the IRS. The amount due is adjusted based on factors
such as taxable income and joint filing status, and is paid along
with the taxpayers income tax return. Those whose income is
below the filing threshold need not pay. The required payment
16 See id. at 1302.
17 See id. at 130003, 130709 (introducing the anti-balkanization perspective in race
equality cases).
18 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012); see also Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
19 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 259394.
20 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (outlining the Taxing and Spending power);
art. I, § 8 cl. 3 (outlining the Commerce Clause power).
21 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
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is not called a tax, a penalty, or anything else. No one would
doubt that this law imposed a tax, and was within Congresss
power to tax. That conclusion should not change simply because
Congress used the word penalty to describe the payment.22
In support of this interpretive orientationthe functional approach23Roberts
adduced various arguments. To begin with, there was precedent for the proposition that
levies could be characterized as taxes, even when they had not been so labeled.24
Furthermore, there was also precedent for the mirror-image proposition. When puta-
tive taxes operate, in practice, as penalties, the Court has characterized them that
way25and what works in one direction, Roberts suggested, ought to work in the
other.26 Robertss third argument rested on broaderand more consciously norma-
tiveprinciples of avoidance. Namely, a law should not be struck down because Con-
gress used the wrong labels, so long as the Constitution [otherwise] permits Congress
to do exactly what [it did].27 In other words, reading for substance can rescue state
action that, on a superficial construction, might have been held unconstitutional.
On the other side, the joint dissent argued that the Court was required to treat the
levy as written.28 The relevant question was not whether Congress had the power
22 Id. at 259798.
23 Id. at 2595.
24 Id. (We have . . . held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless were authorized by
Congresss power to tax. In the License Tax Cases, for example, we held that federal licenses
to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which the licensee had to pay a feecould be sustained
as exercises of the taxing power. (citing License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867))).
25 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (Our cases confirm this functional approach. For example, in
Drexel Furniture, we focused on[the] practical characteristicsof the so-called tax on employing
child laborers that convinced us the tax was actually a penalty. (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furni-
tureCo., 259 U.S. 20, 3637 (1922)); see also Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. at 3637 (holding that
a levy for the use of child labor, despite being labeled by Congress as a tax, in fact operated
as a penalty because of (1) the magnitude of its burden, (2) the existence of a mens rea require-
ment, and (3) the fact that the tax was administered by the Department of Labor, not the IRS).
26 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595. This extrapolation was a key point of contention in the case.
The joint dissent, for example, offered the following rejoinder: In a few cases, this Court has
held that a tax imposed upon private conduct was so onerous as to be in effect a penalty. But
we have never heldneverthat a penalty imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to
be in effect a tax. We have never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the law is an
exercise of Congress taxing powereven when the statute calls it a tax, much less when (as
here) the statute repeatedly calls it a penalty. Id. at 2651 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally
Randy Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate
is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &LIBERTY 581 (2010) (laying out the academic argument
against the individual mandate). Of course, the it hasnt happened yet logic runs both ways.
Never beforeone might arguehad a run-of-the-mill federal regulation been challenged
as afoul of the Constitution.
27 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597 (majority opinion).
28 Id. at 2651 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to frame the minimum-coverage provision as a taxwhich of course it hadbut
whether [Congress actually] did so.29 And the answer was clear: the levythat Congress
built into the ACA was, in substance, just what the statute call[ed] ita penalty.30
The rationales for this position were numerous. To recite but three: No case in the
Courts history (before NFIB) had reframed as a tax what Congress labeled a penalty;31
the levy clearly aimed to penalize those who do not comply with the individual man-
date;32 and textually, the levy was included in Title I of the Act, not Title IX, where the
ACAs other Revenue Provisions. could be found.33 In short, contextual evidence
implied that the ACA levy was, in reality, exactly as Congress had designated it: a
penalty for non-compliance with the individual mandate.
The view of the joint dissenters is certainly understandable. But there is something
awry in their argumentation. At days end, the evidence marshaled by the dissent does
not go to whether legal interpretations should focus on function or, instead, on labels;
it goes to whether the levy actually does function as a tax.34 Indeed, for all their bluster
about the importance of parsing the ACA as written, the dissenting Justices were
actually willing to concede the wisdom of the functional approach, at least in con-
cept.35 At one point, they openly admit that avoidance considerations can make it
salutary to focus on substance rather than labels: if fairly possible, the opinion
argued, we must . . . construe the provision to be a tax rather than a mandate-with-
penalty, since that would render it constitutional rather than unconstitutional.36
Appended to this admission, however, was a stern caveat: functional reading must
not pervert[ ] the purpose of a statute,37 or do[ ] violence to the fair meaning of the
words used.38 And in the immediate case, the dissent thought the balance of reasons
clear: there is simply no way . . . to escape what Congress enacted: a mandate that
individuals maintain minimum essential coverage, enforced by a penalty.39
Yet it is difficult to see how the dissents hedgeadmitting that statutes may be
read for substance, but adding the proviso that no violence should be done to their
wordsis sustainable. The whole point of the functional approach is that it diverts
attention away from a statutes labels.40 So it cannot be that disregard for labels
amounts, by itself, to the perversion of a statutes purpose; otherwise, the caveat
would eviscerate the position it supposes to modify. At the same time, if the caveat is
29 Id.
30 Id. at 2654.
31 Id. at 2651.
32 Id. at 2652.
33 Id. at 2655.
34 Id. at 2652.
35 Id. at 2654.
36 Id. at 2651 (internal citation omitted).
37 Id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Commn v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)).
38 Id. (citing Grenada Cnty. Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 269 (1884)).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2595 (majority opinion).
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read to mean simply that functional reading should not subvert legislative will, it is
difficult to see what work the caveat is doing; it would seem, in practice, to be little
more than an admonition for the Court to take up the functional approach responsibly.
If so, then the idea of staying true to the fair meaning of the [statutes] words, though
rhetorically appealing, simply mischaracterizes what is going on. The statutes words
are exactly not what is at stake.
The most natural conclusion, therefore, is that the dissenting Justices in NFIB
are not opposed to the functional approach as such. They are opposed to how Chief
Justice Robertss opinion for the Court deployed that approach. Put simply, they bridle
at his conclusions, not his method. For the reasons traced above, the joint dissent rejects
the conclusion that the ACA levy operates, in fact, like a tax. That view is perfectly
defensible. It may well be correct. But it has no bone to pick with the functional ap-
proach. To the contrary, it embraces the functional approachand offers a contrary
interpretation within that methodological frame.
II. MAGIC
Ultimately, it comes as little surprise that the majority and the dissent in NFIB
agreeif grudginglyabout the wisdom of the functional approach. Reading for
substance rather than labels has a long pedigree, especially when it comes to issues
of constitutional significance. Taxation provisions, as in NFIB, are one prominent
example.41 But the Court has repudiated the magic words approach in other statutory
settings as well.42 One especially prominent (though non-exclusive) example is the
designation of a rule as jurisdictional rather than substantive, in light of the ripple
effects of that threshold question.43 Dissenting Justices, moreover, are fond of using
41 See id. (enumerating examples); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310
(1992); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 284 (1977); Ry. Express Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959).
42 For examples of the Courts general aversion to parsing statutes by label rather than func-
tion, see, for example, Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 823 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress need not incant the magic phrase attorneys fees
in order to provide for their recovery). See also Gade v. Natl Solid Waste Mgmt. Assn, 505
U.S. 88, 112 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that preemption inquiry should turn
on Congresss clear and manifest purpose, not on magic words). The commitment to
functionalism is also reflecteddoctrinallyin settings that pose a pronounced risk of chill.
For example, when it comes to assessing abortion-restrictive laws, the Court asks whether
a given law imposes an undue burden in practice. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
876 (1992). It does not matter what language the law uses; it does not even matter if the law
makes little to no mention of abortion. What matters is how the law operates. For a timely
example, see Jackson Womens Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 2014)
(holding that it imposes an undue burden on abortion for Mississippi to require all physicians
who work at an abortion facility to have admitting privileges at a local hospitalbecause the
regulation would effectively cause the last abortion clinic in Mississippi to close).
43 See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Regl Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (holding that
Congress need not incant magic words to make clear a grant of jurisdiction); FAA v. Cooper,
132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012) (same); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197,
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the dismissive connotations of magic words to belittle the Courts reasoning. This
tactic has emerged in numerous settings over the yearspleading,44 post-conviction
confinement,45 administrative deference,46 Bivens actions,47 speedy trial provisions,48
and most recently, the practical meaning of Miranda.49
All of this makes sense. The feebleness of label-formalismas Roberts remarked,
during the Noel Canning argument, distinctions balanced on magic words cannot
be that significant50proves very intuitive. It would be odd, to say the least, if our
most fundamental commitments turned out to depend on laws contingent linguistic
features. Words are malleable. Theycan mislead. If labels alone were sufficient to cata-
lyze momentous decisionslike striking down the ACA, or barring entire categories
of federal suit, or circumscribing the sweep of fundamental rightsit would suggest
basic confusion about the enterprise. It would imply that judicial review, a solemn and
cherished institution, had devolved into a triviality; a parlor game.
That is precisely why the phrase magic words is rhetorically effective. When dis-
senting and concurring opinions adopt the slur to criticize the majoritys position,
the point is to suggest that the Court has trivialized the question: that a dimension of
legal meaning has been lost.51 The phrase puts opponents on the defensive, because it
1203 (2011) (concluding that magic words are unnecessary to makea rule jurisdictional); Am.
Natl Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 272 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority
of applying a magic words test for federal jurisdiction that give[s] talismanic significance
to any mention of federal courts) (internal citations omitted).
44 Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 32 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
plaintiffs claim should not be time-barred simply because they failed to include the proper
magic words in their complaint).
45 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 118 n. 13 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
[i]t is surely rather odd to have rules of federal constitutional law turn entirely upon the label
chosen by a State during post-conviction confinement proceedings).
46 Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 208 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference
to agency interpretation cannot hinge on whether the secretary has incanted the proper magic
words).
47 Carlsonv.Green,446U.S.14,31n.2 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Bivens
remedies should not be extended simply because Congress failed to use the right magic words
of limitation).
48 Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 368 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that defen-
dant should not be deprived of dismissal remedy for violation of speedy trial rules simply be-
cause he failed to utter magic words at the magic moment).
49 Berghuis v. Thompkins,560 U.S. 370, 410(2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
criminal defendants should not have to invoke magic words to assert the right to silence). Of
coursein a fun twist of metait stands to reason that the foregoing list is woefully under-
inclusive, since it was compiled using only the search terms magic, words, and labels.
50 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)
(No. 12-1281).
51 At some level, the problem stems from the nature of language. Words refer to reality,
but in an underdetermined sense; reality overflows the referential capacity of words. An entire
field of linguistic theorypragmaticsis dedicated to the exploration of this problem in every-
daylanguage. In legal settings, theanalogous point is that the contentof lawcannot be exhausted
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insinuates that no reasonable interpretive agentno reasonable judgecould believe
that the question depends on so unimportant-seeming a variable.
In light of all this, more noteworthy than what the magic words canon includes
is what it conspicuously lacks. No Justice ever swerves to defend the opinion of the
Court against the magic words accusation by trumpeting the sagacity of label-formal-
ism. Scouring the Courts jurisprudence, I was unable to find a single opinion in which
the following style of a parry emerges in the response to the magic words thrust:
It is true: todays result depends on the words employed in the law,
not the way the law operates in the world. But that is precisely
what mattersand ought to guide the Courts handfor the pur-
poses of constitutional review.
Instead, the uniform response to the allegation of magic words is to deny the
charge. Justices accused of privileging labels over substance respond, simply, that they
have not done so; that their object of inquiry has been the laws substance, even if
that substance happens to align, in practice, with the words the law adopts.
Two examples will help shore up the point. First, consider Reed v. Farley, a case
about the speedy trial guarantee.52 Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act
(IAD), prisoners serving time in one jurisdiction may be transferred elsewhere
temporarilyfor the purpose of being tried for a different crime.53 The Act includes
a very clear speedy trial provision: the trial of the transferred prisoner shall be
commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the
receiving State, or else the charges are dismissed with prejudice.54 While Reed, the
petitioner, was serving a sentence in federal prison in Indiana, the State of Indiana
decided to prosecute him for theft.55 Pursuant to the IAD, Indiana authorities took
by the a-contextual examination of its words. See STEPHEN BREYER,MAKINGOURDEMOCRACY
WORK 91 (2010) ([Interpretive] uncertainty does not arise because the statutes language has
an unclear technical meaning or because ordinary readers fail to understand the general kinds
of situations to which the statutes language refers . . . . Rather, [statutes are often] ambiguous
or uncertain in respect to the scope of [their] coverage.). Examples of this phenomenon
abound in the case law. To take but one recent example: in Bond v. United States, the Court
held that a Pennsylvania woman who tried to give her adversary a chemical rash had not used
a chemical weapon for the purposes of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act. See 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2084 (2014). The Courts argument, in relevant part, was that de-
spite the fact that the Act literally reached Ms. Bonds conduct, no ordinary English speaker
would think of that conduct as involving a chemical weapon. Id. at 209091.
52 512 U.S. 339 (1994). The procedural posture of Reed is somewhat complicatedthe
petitioner was raising his Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) timeliness challenge
on habeas appeal, claiming that his clearly established federal rights had been violated but
the core principles are very clear. See id. at 34748.
53 Id. at 341.
54 Id. at 34142.
55 Id. at 342.
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custody of Reed on April 27th, which meant, under the statutes terms, that a trial had
to commence on or before August 25th.56 Due to a variety of variables, a trial was set
for September 13th, at the parties consentincluding Reeds.57 On August 29th, how-
ever, a few days after the 120-day window had lapsed, Reed filed a petition for dis-
charge, arguing that Indiana had failed to try him within the 120-day window, and that
IAD therefore required his immediate release.58
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, held against Reeddenying his habeas
appealon two grounds. The first was that she did not find Reeds injury consti-
tutionally significant; the assignment of a trial date twenty or so days outside the statu-
tory window rank[ed], in her estimation, with the nonconstitutional lapses we have
[previously] held not cognizable as grounds for a collateral appeal.59 The second ra-
tionale was that Reed had numerous opportunities to raise the IAD problem during the
course of scheduling, but he decided, instead, to stay muteand then capitalize on the
states (and judges) error to set the trial date outside the statutory window.60 In Justice
Ginsburgs words:
At the pretrial hearings . . . Reed not only failed to mention the
120-day limit; he indicated a preference for holding the trial after
his release from federal imprisonment, which was due to occur
after the 120 days expired. Then, on the 124th day, when it was no
longer possible to meet Article IV(c)s deadline, Reed produced
his meticulously precise Petition for Discharge.61
In other words, it appeared that Reed, far from being an innocent victim, may well
have orchestrated the IAD conundrum as a means of exploiting a technicality to
escape criminal liability. This result, Justice Ginsburg would not abide.62
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, took a rather different view of the case. The merits
of the 120-day deadline were not at issue; what was at issue was the meaning of the
IAD, which Blackmun saw as an issue of unmistakable clarity.63 Congress set a hard-
and-fast deadline, and it articulated aclearconsequence in theevent of non-compliance:
dismissal with prejudice.64 The clarityand gravityof this remedy cannot change,
56 Id.
57 Id. at 343.
58 Id. at 344.
59 Id. at 34950 (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962) (holding that a trial
courts failure, at sentencing, to invite a convicted defendant to present mitigating evidence did
not provide sufficient grounds for collateral appealgiven that there was no evidence that the
defendant actually intended to speak)).
60 Id. at 35051.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 352.
63 Id. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64 Id.
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Blackmun reasoned, simply because the prisoner in this particular case was less than
forthright about the IADs requirements.65 In Blackmuns words:
surely [a] violation that Congress found troubling enough to war-
rant the severe remedy of dismissal cannot become trivial simply
because the defendant did notutterwhat this Court later determines
to be the magic words at the magic moment, particularly in the
absence of any congressional requirement that the defendant
either invoke his right to a timely trial or object to the setting of
an untimely trial date.66 Therefore, the case against Reed should
be dismissed.
In response to the accusation that she was engaged in magic words analysis, one
might have expected Justice Ginsburg to simply double-down. After all, her opinion
obviously reads an invocation requirement (of some kind) into the IADs speedy trial
provision; which is to say, it does seem to make the efficacy of the IAD on the
presence or absence of magic words [uttered] at the magic moment.67 What harm
would result from acknowledging that outright? But Ginsburg opted for a different
route. She fell back on principles. In the first instance, a structural principle: Ginsburg
emphasized that federal habeas appeals play an importantbut self-consciously
rarerole in the judicial system, and that the system as a whole is poorly served when
essentially inconsequential errors are allowed to disrupt its functioning.68 And in the
second instance, an equitable principle: it manifestly did not seem right to Ginsburg
that a would-be defendant could evade the states prosecutorial power by strategically
keeping mum.69 Formalities had nothing to do with it.
A second example is Schiavone v. Fortune.70 On May 9th, 1983, the petitioners
brought a libel action against Fortune magazine.71 The complaint, which named For-
tune as the exclusive defendant, was served on Time, Inc., the New York corporation
that owned and controlled Fortune magazine; at which point Times agent refused
service because Time was not named as a defendant.72 Undaunted, the petitioners
amended their complaint on July 18th, 1983, changing references to the defendant
from Fortune to Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated.73 Problem solved! Or
so it would seem. In fact, Time promptly moved to dismiss the case on the grounds
that New Jersey state law required libel actions to be commenced within one year of
65 Id. at 368.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
69 Id. at 350.
70 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
71 Id. at 22.
72 Id. at 2223.
73 Id. at 23.
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the publication of the alleged libel,74 andconveniently for Timealthough the
initial complaint had been filed within the one-year period, the amended complaint
had not.75 Therefore, Time argued, it had not received legally adequate notice of the
allegations within the mandatory time frame, and Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure required dismissal.76 And the district court, with great reluctance,
agreed.77 Petitioners appealed this determination, lost, and sought certiorari.78
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, agreed with the district and circuit
courts: the case should be dismissed. Rule 15(c), he argued, permits relating back
an amended complaint to an original complaint, including changing the named defen-
dant, but only if the amendment occurs within the period provided by law for com-
mencing the action.79 In Schiavone, the timing condition was not satisfied; and that
was fatal . . . to petitioners litigation.80
Justice Stevens filed a spirited dissent, rejecting the Courts logic root and branch.
Although the majority purported to rely exclusively on the plain language of Rule
15(c), in Stevens view, this claim rested on a faulty premise: the relation back
test laid out in Rule 15(c) is utterly irrelevant unless the amendment is one changing
the party against whom a claim is asserted, and [i]n this case, the technical cor-
rection filed in July added absolutely nothing to any partys understanding of the party
against whom the claims were asserted.81 The effect of the majoritys view, therefore,
was tounjustlypreclude a potentially meritorious cause of action, simply because
petitioners had failed to add[ ] the magic words to their complaint on the right date.82
Just like in Reed, the majority in Schiavone did not squarely address the magic
words accusation. Instead, it reframed the case in terms of substantive principlesin
particular, the principle of noticewhich in the majoritys view form the linchpin
of Rule 15.83 Put simply, parties have the right to be made aware of the legal allegations
74 Id.
75 Id. at 24.
76 Id. at 26.
77 Id. at 24.
78 Id. at 25.
79 Id. at 30.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 34-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevensprovided a helpful analogy to glosshispoint:
If an original complaint names Smith as the tortfeasor and the plaintiff does not decide to
sue Jones until after the statute of limitations has run, there would be obvious prejudice in
allowing an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted unless Jones
had actual notice of the claim before the statute ran. . . . [By contrast], the difference between
the description of the publisher of Fortune in the original complaints and the description of
the publisher of Fortune in the amended complaints is no more significant than a misspelling,
or perhaps a reference to Time, Inc. instead of Time, Incorporated. Id. at 3536.
82 Id. at 32.
83 Id. at 31 (majority opinion). In a similar vein, Blackmunaddressing the magic words
issue more squarelyclarifies that [w]e do not have before us a choice between a liberal ap-
proach toward Rule 15(c), on the one hand, and a technical interpretation of the Rule, on the
2015] MAGIC WORDS 771
against them in a timely matter. To deprive Time, Inc.and all other such defendants
of that right would work injustice the other way.
This is not to say that the majoritys view is necessarily correct, or more high-
minded than the dissents. It is simply to note that, when the chips are down, the
majoritys view is hitched to principles, not technicalitiesin fact, in defending his
more formalistic position, Blackmun explicitly denounces the possibility of mere tech-
nicalities frustrating decisions on the merits.84 A striking sentencegiven how
easy it is to imagine a counterfactual opinion, utterly steeped in technicality that arrives
at the same result. It is not the role of this Courtone can readily imagine Blackmun,
or any other Justice, writingto pronounce on what seems fair in cases like this.
The balance of interests has already been struck by universally-accepted practices
of service. Plaintiffs must name the correct defendant in complaintsperiod. Call this
magic words if you like; but it is a basic requirement in our legal system.85
***
What examples like these suggest is that few judgesperhaps nonetruly embrace
the view that labels trump substance. Rather, in Reed and Schiavone, no less than
in NFIB, the dispute stemmed from competing notions of legal substance. That is, even
when it appeared as though the Justices were disagreeing, in a basic way, about how to
interpret legal texts, in fact they were disagreeing about the thing lawyers and judges
have always disagreed about: what legal texts mean. When one side accuses the other
of succumbing to the allure of labels, and the other side rejects that accusation, both are
ultimately saying the same thing: We have the correct view of the law. Magic words
may be an effective flourish. But in practice, that is all it is.
III. FALSE MAGIC
Fineone might respondbut even if functionalist interpretation serves the
default, clearly there are cases where judges look to labels to resolve interpretive
questionscases governed by clear statement rules. When clear statement rules are
other hand. The choice, instead, is between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule provides
in plain language. Id. at 30.
84 Id. at 27 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)). Presumably, the dissents re-
joinder would be that whatever the majoritys intentions, its view still ended up hitched to a
technicality. Indeed, that is always the point of the magic words accusation. But that is not how
the majority in Schiavone understood its own machinations.
85 After all, this kind of formalist argumentation is hardly foreign to our jurisprudence
especially when it comes to cases involving missed deadlines. See, e.g., Dolan v. United States,
560 U.S. 605, 629 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the unfortunate consequences
associated with a sentencing court failing to issue a restitution order within the allotted 90-day
window as the unavoidable result of having a system of rules). The point, of course, is not
that this style of deadline formalism is necessarily availing. Reasonable minds will disagree.
The point is that the argument is intelligible. It does not come off as a needless embrace of
minutiaein the way that the equivalent embrace of magic words no doubt would.
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in effect, courts refuse to give force to statutory or contractual language solely on the
basis that the relevant drafterslegislators in the case of statutory construction, private
parties in the case of contract constructiondid not incant the right words. How can
this practice be squared with the proposition that labels are subordinate to substance?
Although the question is an intuitive one, ultimately, the analysis runs the other
way. It is easy to see how clear statement rules could be taken to vindicate label-
formalism; their purpose, after all, is to create specific linguistic triggers. But the
necessity of clear statement rules in fact underscores the primacy of functionalist
interpretation. As an exception, they do not undermine the norm. They reinforce it.
Clear statement rules incent cautious drafting. They impose a clarity tax86 on
actors that express their intentions in anything less than the exactmagicwords.
For example, there are numerous constitutional domains in which the Court requires
Congress to signal its intentions very explicitlylike when it conditions federal
funding under the Spending Clause,87 or when it seeks to give new rules a retroactive
effect,88 or when it intends for laws to apply extraterritorially.89 Likewise with respect
to private contracting. When parties seek to opt out of default contract terms, courts
sometimes require that this intention be codified in crystal-clear language.90 In both
86 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM.L.REV.
399, 403 (2010).
87 See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006) (holding that
Congress had not acted with sufficient clarity to trigger its Spending Clause power, despite
the existence of ample legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to bind state
governments); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (emphasizing the importance
of Congress having clearly stated its intent to tie federal funding to the enforcement of a
twenty-one year minimum drinking age); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (The crucial inquiry . . . is not whether a State would knowingly undertake
that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that the State
could make an informed choice.); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246
(2009) (rationalizing the Pennhurst rule in terms of notice to state governments).
88 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (Absent a clear statement
of [legislative] intent, we do not give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private interests.);
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (outlining a blanket presumption
against statutory retroactivity). For an overview of retroactivity-related clear statement rules
and their rationalessee Manning, supra note 86, at 41012.
89 See, e.g., Morrison v. Natl Australian Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (giving a limited construction to the extraterrorially ap-
plicable section of the Patent ActSection 271(f)on the grounds the decision is one for Con-
gress to make); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013)
(discussing the policy justifications underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality).
90 See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALEL.
J. 2032, 204849 (2012) (arguing that clear statement rules are one of four possible ways of regu-
lating opt-out decisions in private contractingthey make specification of intent both neces-
sary and sufficient for producinga particular legal outcome). For background on thisconceptual
description of clear statement ruleswhich Ayres draws onsee Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 211923 (2002).
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settings, the same underlying rationale obtains: stability. Before adopting statutory
and contractual constructions with potentially destabilizing effects, courts look for
additional assurance that the parties intended those effects to come about.91
In one sense, then, clear statement rules collar the latitude of non-judicial actors:
they require adherence to rigid drafting rules. But at the very same time, however,
clear statement rules also empower non-judicial actors. Structurally, the purpose of
clear statement rules is to transfer interpretive jurisdiction, so to speak, away from
the judiciary, to grant to other actors (legislators or private parties) authority over
a specific set of questions.92 To accomplish this, clear statement rules supplant the
natural dynamics of interpretation with rigid if-then functions. Instead of asking
dynamicallywhat a statute means, or what a contract requires, clear statement rules
require judges to look for specific linguistic triggers: magic words.93 If the words are
present, result one; if not, result two. In this sense, clear statement rules strip courts
of interpretive latitudethey compel judges to adopt a wooden reading of a statute
or contract, even when (as is nearly always the case) a more natural interpretation
is available.
This aspect of clear statement rules has eluded full elaboration. For some scholars,
the fact that clear statement rules have the capacity to thwart the will of non-judicial
actors, which they plainlydo, is evidence that the rules empower judges.94 Indeed, even
91 See, e.g., Terry Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement
Rule for Spending Clause Litigation, 84 TUL.L.REV. 1067, 111416 (2010) (compiling nor-
mative rationales for clear statement rules); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public
Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment
Costs, 118 YALE L. J. 2, 2, 62 (2008) (thinking about clear statement rules as enactment cost
manipulationi.e., conservative measures designed to make the costs of any change, posi-
tive or negative, greater); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
33132 (2000) (discussing the role that clear statement rules play in maintaining a stable bal-
ance of power between Congress and executive agencies); see also Ayres, supra note 90, at
2046, 206163 (discussing the inherent tradeoff between cost and error in the calibration of
opt-out rules); Rosenkranz, supra note 90, at 211923.
92 Rosenkranz, supra note 90, at 2155.
93 See Ayers, supra note 90, at 204849.
94 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 59697 (1992)
(describing the rise of clear statement rules as ushering in a new era of judicial activismand
hence empowermentin the realm of statutory construction); Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretationin the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 81516
(1983) (arguing that the avoidance canonwhich is effectively a clear statement rule
requiring legislatures to force constitutional questions explicitly to the surfacehas led to
the creation of penumbra that tip the balance of power in favor of judges); Seligmann,
supra note 91, at 1067 (describing clear statement rules as a tool that the Supreme Courts
conservative members have developed and begun to use . . . aggressively to frustrate
legislative prerogatives); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and
the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1605 (2000) (describing clear
statement rules as a way that courts re-empower themselves in light of the lack of strong,
invalidation-type limits on the power of other parties).
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among those who defend clear statement rules, there is a tendency to describe the rules
as tools, wielded by judges, to enforce constitutional norms and boundaries.95 The
judge-empowering view is understandablebut conceptually, it gets something impor-
tantly backwards.96 Although it is certainly true that, in practice, clear statement rules
can frustrate drafters intentions, this observation is fully compatible with the claim that
clear statement rules empower drafters. Indeed, in many cases, the frustration of draft-
ers intentions is likely to occur because of, not in spite of, their empowerment.97
Take an everyday example. Jack and Jill run a hedge fund. Jill is the mastermind
investor; Jack is in charge of implementing Jills decisions (placing orders in the mar-
ket, and so forth). To ensure that Jack performs his role properly, the two of them have
devised a clear statement rule: Jack will not execute any trades until Jill says, Make
the trade. One day, Jill is out of the office, and she decides that the funds portfolio
should have some Apple stock. So she sends the following text message to Jack:
Would be a good idea to buy 1,000 shares of Apple. When Jill returns to the office
a few hours later, she asks Jack how the Apple purchase went. To which Jack responds:
Apple purchase? You didnt say Make the trade, so I didnt purchase any Apple!
Jillbeset with human foibles, as many money managers aregets upset with Jack.
When he declined to buy Apple stock, Jill believes that Jack undermined her will.
In this example, two things are true simultaneously. First, Jills claim is correct:
Jacks decision not to buy Apple stockwe can reasonably surmisedid thwart
Jills intentions. Second, it is Jill, not Jack, who has the greater interpretive authority
in this arrangement, for it is Jill, not Jack, who is entrusted with ultimate decision-
making power. One implication of the example, then, is that from the observation that
an actors will was not vindicated, it does not follow that the actor does not possess
interpretive authority. But the point can be sharpened further. Here, the subversion
of Jills will is not merely compatible with her having the interpretive authority. In
fact, the subversion of her will was almost certainly the direct result of her having
the interpretive authority, since the mechanism establishing that authoritythe clear
statement rulewas precisely the cause of the problem.
95 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 91, at 317 (suggesting that courts use non-delegation doc-
trinesof which clear statement rules are a subsetto establish conditions of democracy-
forcing minimalism); Young, supra note 94, at 158593 (describing clear statement rulesin
a laudatory wayas a mechanism that courts employ to enforce constitutional values).
96 To be fair, certainly not every scholar has committed this error. For example, John F.
Manning has suggested that clear statement rules, when understood against the background
ofotherpossibleapproaches to regulationof legislative action, are comparativelydisempowering
of judges, since [c]lear statement rules almost surely intrude less than would Marbury-style
judicial review. Manning, supra note 86, at 403. Similarly, Brian Galle has argued that clear
statement rules actively empower legislative bodies, even as they impose constraints on how
legislators must wield that power. See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear
Statement Rules With Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN.
L. REV. 155, 157 (2004) (In effect, the Supreme Court has given Congress free reign to
legislate under the Spending Clause, but only if Congress legislates badly.).
97 See Galle, supra note 96, at 180.
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In other words, it is very likely that Jack, were he liberated from the strictures
of the clear statement rule and empowered to parse Jills statements naturally, would
have construed her text messagecorrectlyas an authorization to buy Apple stock.
What this suggests is that clear statement rules are a prophylactic measure. They
provide a means, in Scott Shapiros terms, of compensating for [the] distrust of a
specific actors ability (in this case, Jacks) to properly interpret the will of another
(in this case, Jills).98 Put otherwise, the rationale for the clear statement rule is not
that it will always yield more perspicuous results than would allowing Jack to naturally
interpret Jills commands. The rationale is that Jack cannot be trusted to naturally
interpret Jills commandsthat if he were so entrusted, grave errors might resultsuch
that even in cases (like the foregoing example) where Jacks natural interpretation
would yield more perspicuous results than the clear statement rule, the former still
must give way to the latter.
What is true for Jack in the hedge fund example is also true for judges, mutatis
mutandis, in settings governed by clear statement rules. When such rules are in effect,
the courts role transforms. Instead of making an interpretive decision in its own right,
the court defers to the interpretive decision of a different body.99 In this sense, the
label-formalism of clear statement rules is not so much a different method of judicial
interpretation as it is, in effect, the absence of judicial interpretation. Like other modes
of formalism, label-formalism diverts interpretive authority away from the actors who
parse legal documentsjudgesto the actors who draft themlegislators and private
parties.100 In other words, clear statement rules are, by their nature, deferential to non-
judicial actors. Even if they rely on specific triggers in order to go into effect, when
they are in effect, the effect is precisely to divest courts of interpretive authority
just as Jack and Jills clear statement rule divested Jack of the same.
To be sure, this discussion has not resolvedindeed, it has not even addressed
the policy question of when clear statement rules are salutary. I have no prescriptions
98 See SCOTT SHAPIRO,LEGALITY 33153 (2011) (arguing that lawdistributes interpretive
authority across different classes of actors in order to compensate for distrust, on the one hand,
and capitalize on trust, on the other). For an excellent summary of Shapiros position, see
Joshua P. Davis, Legality, Morality, Duality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 55, 6061 (2014). There
are many reasons, of course, that we might distrust the ability of judges to parse legislative
intent. One particularly interesting argument is that the nature of languageand the specific
ways in which lawyers and judges are taught to think about languagefates us to a certain
amount of interpretive error. See Jill Anderson, Misreading Like A Lawyer, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1522, 1525 (2014).
99 See Fred Erick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 544 (1988).
100 See generally id. (describing formalism as either the denial of choice or the limita-
tion of choice). This description speaks toand is borne out bythe main criticism of formal-
ism, which is precisely that judicial choice is not, in fact, limited; that the judge who claims
strength from formalist precept is confused (or simply being dishonest) about the interpretive
labor. See id. 51720 (exploring the anti-formalist critique that there is always a choice);
see also Steven L. Winter, John Robertss Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 549,
550 (2009).
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on that front. The point is that whatever the optimal distribution of clear statement
rules, their nature is clear. They diminish the interpretive authority of courts; they nip
the interpretive process in the bud. And in this sense, clear statement rules are the nat-
ural outcropping of functionalist interpretation. If legal content were generally thought
to inhere in labels, garden variety interpretation would naturally light the way. Clear
statement rules would be unnecessary, and they would not exist. But in practice, just
the opposite is true. Functionalist interpretation reigns supreme, and clear statement
rules are exceptions to that norm.
IV. EVIL MAGIC
Yet there is another exceptiona genuine exception, unlike clear statement rules
to the norm of functionalist interpretation, a setting in which words really do take on
a magical quality: race equal protection. In these cases, racial labels are treated as
evil magic, casting inherent doubt on a laws constitutional status. This Part draws on
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1101 and the work
of Reva Siegel, to suggest that the Courts aversion to racial labels is divisible into two
conceptually distinct viewsthe colorblindness view and the anti-balkanization
viewand that while the former is compatible with functionalist precepts, the latter
is not.
As it is presently understood, the Fourteenth Amendment erects a tiered system
of scrutiny.102 A law or policy that is facially discriminatorythat draws distinctions
on the basis of race (white, black, etc.)triggers strict scrutiny.103 To overcome
strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that the law or policy is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interestan extremely tall order.104 If, on the
other hand, a law or policy is facially neutral, but it yields a disparate impact in prac-
tice, it is reviewed for rationality.105 As long as the law or policy has a rational basis
and was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose, it stands.106
101 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
102 See id. at 800.
103 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 69496
(4th ed. 2011); see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (2007) (In order to satisfy this
searching standard of review, the [government] must demonstrate that the use of individual
racial classifications . . . is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.)
(citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
104 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, Affirmative Action, 107 YALEL.J. 427, 43334 (1997).
105 Id. at 452.
106 This, of course, is not the only way that the race equality doctrine could be operational-
ized. Indeed, scholars have long been clamoring for an anti-subordination approach to race
equality protection, which would look to the purpose of lawswhether the law works to
reify, or instead undo past and present racial hierarchy. For the classic statement of this view,
see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107,
16061 (1976). For a historical genealogy of competing interpretations of race equality, see
generally Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
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By emphasizing the language of a given law or policynot what the law does, but
instead, if the law draws on racial labels to do what it doesthe tiered framework
of race equality analysis is an outlier to the trend of functionalist interpretation. The
rationale for this is not mysterious. Racial labels, precisely as labels, have a sordid
legacy in our constitutional order.107 The use of such labels, therefore, is inherently
cause for constitutional concern. Put simply, if the government is explicitlydiscriminat-
ing on the basis of race, it better have a good reason.
In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court considered whether it violated the Equal
Protection Clause for public school districts across the country to adopt a racial quota
system for rebalancing the demography of their elementary and secondary schools.108
Because the racial quota systems unambiguously drew distinctions on the basis of race,
the Court applied strict scrutiny.109 On this point, all nine Justices agreed: the quotas
involved an inherently suspect use of racial labels.110 The questionand source of
disagreementwas whether the school districts had an interest that was sufficiently
compelling, and narrowly enough tailored, to vindicate the use of racial labels.111
In his plurality opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the
quota systems failed strict scrutiny.112 He argued, first, that the school districts had
demonstrated no compelling interest in racial rebalancing, since the history of seg-
regation in Seattle and Louisville had been de facto, not sanctioned by law;113 and
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV.L.REV. 1470, 1470 (2004). Fora record of this
road-not-taken in the case law, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288
(1978) (entertainingand ultimately rejectingthe proposition that strict scrutiny should be
reserved for classifications that disadvantage discrete and insular minorities (citing United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))). This anti-subordination ap-
proach is effectively the analytic inverse of the currently existing anti-classification paradigm.
Whereas the current paradigm (which, by way of contrast, has been called the anti-classifi-
cation approach) strikes a permissive stance toward laws that happen to yield disparities along
racial lines, the anti-subordination framework would be especially sensitive to such laws.
107 This, of course, is not the only lesson that one might draw from Brown and its ilk. One
might say that racial subordination has a sordid legacy in our constitutional order, or even
that colorblindnessif that term is understood to refer to laws disregard for racial realityhas
a sordid legacy. For an insightful discussion of how Brown has come to be branded, see
Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 385, 40105
(2009). See also Scarlet Kim, Note, Judicial Opinion as Historical Account: Parents Involved
and the Modern Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 159,
15960 (2011).
108 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 70911
(2007).
109 Id. at 720.
110 Id. at 741.
111 Id. at 740.
112 Id. at 745.
113 Id. at 736. The only interests that Chief Justice Roberts identified as legitimatebased on
precedentwere (1) ameliorating the effects of past de jure discrimination and (2) promoting
diversity in higher education. Id. at 72022.
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second, that even assuming arguendo that a compelling state interest existed, the plan
had not been narrowly tailored.114 In the primary dissent, Justice Breyerjoined by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souteroffered a number of impassioned rejoinders,
both as to the pluralitys assessment of the state interests involved and as to its sub-
sequent analysis.115 Put simply, Breyer thought that the plurality got the lesson of
Brownperverselybackwards.116 It stands for the proposition that racial subordi-
nation will not persist with redress, not for the proposition that race-conscious law-
making is categorically suspect.117
The most noteworthy opinion in Parents Involved, however, is Justice Kennedys
concurrenceboth because it effectively states the law, and because of his distinctive
approach to the case. Though he agreed, ultimately, with Chief Justice Robertss
conclusion that the quota systems were unconstitutional, Kennedy disagreed with the
pluralitys logic on two fronts. First, he argued that the plurality had neglected an im-
portant state interest: [d]iversity, which, depending on its meaning and definition,
can be a compelling educational goal [for] a [school] district [to] pursue.118 Second,
Kennedy bristled at the ideawhich was central to the pluralitys logicthat the
Constitution onlypermits school districts to redress de jure segregation.119 To Kennedy,
it seemed clear that reach[ing] Browns objective of equal educational opportunity
will sometimes require addressing de facto segregation as well.120 To conclude other-
wise, Kennedy thought, would be to disregard the fact that in spite of the [t]he endur-
ing hope . . . that race should not matter[,] the reality is that too often it does.121
At the same time, Kennedy was also dissatisfied with the dissent, which seemed to
him too deferential to the school districts.122 Specifically, Kennedy thought that Seattle
and Louisville had failed to meet their burden in two ways. First, the districts had not
established that the specific racial categories adopted by the quota systemswhite
and non-whitewere closely tethered to the interest in diversity that the labels
supposedly meant to advance.123 Second, the school district failed to show that the
quota systems were administered so as to avoid caprice.124 For these reasons, Kennedy
was impelled to depart from the main dissent. Although he agreed, more or less, with
its treatment of the compelling interest issue, Kennedy disagreed with its tailoring
114 Id. at 735.
115 Id. at 84355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 863, 868.
117 See id. at 80304; see also id. at 79899 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (There is a cruel
irony in The Chief Justices reliance on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education.).
118 Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 78788.
120 Id. at 788.
121 Id. at 787.
122 Id. at 790.
123 Id. at 787.
124 Id.
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analysis. Simply put, there were better ways for the school districts to accomplish the
same objectives.125
Justice Kennedys legal position in Parents Involvedthat the school districts had
a compelling interest in recomposing the racial demography of their student bodies,
but that their quota systems were not properly tailored to achieve that goalis not
so remarkable. In settings that involve strict scrutiny, tailoring often becomes the site
of dispute. Far more interesting is the principle underlying Justice Kennedys dismay.
Over the course of his concurrence, it becomes clear that narrow tailoring, though
certainly the doctrinal vocabulary through which Kennedy expressed his concerns,
was actually something of a misnomer.126 The real problem was that Kennedy frowns
on the use of racial labelsperiod. And by decrying the tailoring of the programs,
what Kennedy meant to convey is that the districts opted to use such labels even though
it was not strictly necessary to do so.127 Hints of this position were peppered throughout
the opinion, but the full explication was reserved for the end, when Kennedy wrote that
[t]o be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity
of individuals in our society,128 and even more pointedly, that racial labels threaten
to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one schools supply
and anothers demand.129
It is against this vividand somewhat luridbackdrop that Kennedys solution
comes to the fore. In his view, school districts should be allowedperhaps they should
even be encouragedto pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse back-
grounds and races, alongside other race-conscious goals. But these must be pursued
without the taint of racial labels.130 To this end, Kennedy enumerated a list of possible
approaches that school administrators might take, in the future, to realize their policy
goals while circumventing (his particular notion of) constitutional harm. These include:
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recog-
nition of thedemographics ofneighborhoods; allocatingresources for special programs;
[and] recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion.131 Indeed, on Kennedys
view, these efforts would not only be likely to survive strict scrutiny; they probably
125 Id. at 78384.
126 Id. at 787.
127 Id. at 796 (The State must seek alternatives to the classification and differential treatment
of individuals byrace, at least absent some extraordinary showing not present here.). Notice that
this transforms the tailoring inquiry entirelyKennedy is not asking for the most direct and
efficient way of advancing the state interest (a la the least restrictive means test). He is asking
for policies that are consciously circuitousthat is, less narrowly tailored to the objective at
handin order to avoid a different kind of harm.
128 Id. at 797.
129 Id. at 798.
130 Id. at 789.
131 Id. Kennedys list also includes tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics
by race, but I leave this out for the sake of clarity. For it is unclear, by the lights of his own
theory, how race-based tracking would count as a race-neutral means.
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would not even trigger strict scrutiny because, despite being race conscious, they do
not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or
she is to be defined by race.132
Reva Siegel has shown that the difference between the plurality opinion in Parents
Involved and Justice Kennedys concurrence ultimately comes back to fundamentally
distinct conceptions of equality.133 As Siegel aptly puts it, the position that Justice
Kennedy stakes out, is not intelligible within a framework that treats government ef-
forts to integrate as morally indistinguishable from government efforts to segregate.
If a race-conscious purpose is unconstitutional, how does concealing the aim enhance
its legitimacy?134
That is no doubt exactly what Chief Justice Robertsand the other Justices in
the pluralitywere wondering when they read Kennedys concurrence. In the plu-
ralitys view, the harm of the quota systems is their race-conscious nature.135 That they
use racial labels is evidence of this harm, but it is not coextensive with the harm.
Efforts to retool the racial demography of public schools without resorting to racial
labelssuch as cleverly drawing attendance zones136would fare no better on the
pluralitys view. They would simply be more difficult to detect. For Chief Justice
Roberts, in other words, the enemy is not racial labels. The enemy is racial balanc-
ing,137 and the relevant equality norm is colorblindness. Any policy that deviates from
that normwhether or not its deviation is explicitly announcedshould arouse
constitutional suspicion.138
132 Id.
133 See Siegel, supra note 13, at 1308.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1283.
136 Id. at 1308.
137 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007)
(Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the imposition of racial
proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that [a]t the
heart of the Constitutions guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual or national class. (internal citations omitted)).
138 This is not to say that the colorblindness view necessarily leads to suspicion of all race-
consciousbut faciallyneutral programs. Formally, it maybe possible to reconcile colorblindness
principles with the use of race-conscious but facially neutral policies. See Siegel, supra note
13, at 130910, 1314 n. 107 (discussing ambiguities as to what the color blindness position im-
plies for race-conscious but faciallyneutral policies). At the same time, numerous proponents of
the colorblindness viewseemto believe the two are irreconcilable. This is certainly the direction
in which Chief Justice Robertss opinion in Parents Involved seems to shade, and it is a position
that Justice Scalia, for one, has explicitly endorsed in other race equality cases. See Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Title VIIs disparate
impact provisionto the extent that it requires government employers to be race-conscious
in their evaluation and implementation of policies, in order to avoid liabilitycollides with equal
protection principles). Cf. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV.L.REV. 493, 495 (2003) (noting that there are serious conceptual tensions
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Not so for JusticeKennedy. As Siegel has persuasivelyshown, Justice Kennedybe-
gins from an entirely different equality norm than the Parents Involved plurality
the anti-balkanization principle.139 The core of this principle is social cohesion; it
begins from a keen awareness of the fact that both racial stratification and its
repair have the capacity to stoke tension and resentment within the polity.140 For
Kennedy, the practical implication of this view is that racial labelswhich, again,
threaten to reduce [people] to racial chits141must be avoided at all costs. Kennedy
sees individualized racial classification as especially likely to affront individual dig-
nity and so to exacerbate group division,142 which is why he goes to such pains to
emphasize that [h]ad the school districts simply relied on race-conscious but facially
neutral attendance zones to promote integration, instead of using race to evaluate in-
dividual student applications to magnet schools, he would have upheld the policy.143
In other words, what disturbed Kennedy was not the function of the quota systems. If
anything, he found the function laudable. What disturbed Kennedy was the specific
labelsthe magic wordsthat the quota systems employed.
Justice Kennedys Parents Involved concurrence is not the first opinion, nor is
Kennedy the first Supreme Court Justice,144 to distinguish race-conscious ends from
race-conscious meansand to exalt the former while decrying the latter. The anti-
balkanization view has a clear upside. In a society committed to the enduring hope . . .
that race should not matter,145 the view is sensitive to how corrosive race-conscious
lawmaking can become. And there is certainly normative appeal to the proposition
a modest proposition, after allthat racial labels should be avoided unless abso-
lutely necessary.
But for all of its virtues, the anti-balkanization view is also beset with an important
flaw. Justice Souter made the point eloquently in his dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger,
which struck down an affirmative action program at the University of Michigan that
awarded applicants bonus points based on race.146 One of the arguments in support
of this holdingdrawing strength from anti-balkanization normswas that Michigan,
like sibling states that had confronted the problem of racial underrepresentation in
between modern equal protection doctrine, which go to the heart of what race equality means
and disparate impact law).
139 See Siegal, supra note 13, at 1308.
140 Id. at 1308 (emphasis added).
141 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Siegal, supra note 13, at 1308.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 29899 (1978) (Disparate
constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic
antagonisms rather than alleviate them.); see generally Siegel, supra note 13, at 12931300
(arguing that Justice OConnor, and to some extent, Justice Powell, also fall into the anti-
balkanization camp).
145 Siegel, supra note 13, at 1306.
146 539 U.S. 244, 291 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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higher education, was free to pursue the same objectives by race-neutral means: for
example, by guaranteeing admission to a fixed percentage of the top students from
each high school.147
At this submission, Justice Souter cried foul:
While there is nothing unconstitutional about [this solution], it
nonetheless suffers from a serious disadvantage. It is the disad-
vantage of deliberate obfuscation. The percentage plans are just
as race conscious as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they get
their racially diverse results without saying directly what they
are doing or why they are doing it. In contrast, Michigan states
its purpose directly and, if this were a doubtful case for me, I
would be tempted to give Michigan an extra point of its own for its
frankness. Equal protection cannot become an exercise in which
the winners are the ones who hide the ball.148
Souters dismay is as easy to understand. To reward officials for hid[ing] the ball
does seem to set odd precedentand yield perverse incentives. And this is even more
acutely the case in a constitutional setting like race equality jurisprudence, which is
partly motivated by concern about the alienation that occurs when citizens receive
less-than-dignified treatment from the state.149
Here, in fact, the anti-balkanization logic verges on self-defeating. In the abstract,
there is little reason to think that policies which camouflage150 their chief purpose
are more conducive to social cohesion than policies whichcandidlyadopt racial
labels. This is not to apologize for the use of such labels, or to downplay the possibility
of their having divisive effects in practice. It is simply to put the question in compara-
tive perspective. The effort to stake out middle ground is just as likely to come off inau-
thenticand exacerbate controversyas it is to make progress. Which result is more
likely in which settings is an empirical question, and not one that can be answered to
satisfaction here. Thepoint is that theanti-balkanization view, in itsenthusiasmto avoid
the tension created by racial labels, easily loses sight of another possible source of
tension: pretending that laws are race-neutral when everyone knows they are not.
But this underscores another, more enduring problem which the anti-balkani-
zation view. The problem with encouraging race-conscious but facially neutral policies
is not only that such policies fail to say[ ] directly what they are doing [and] why they
147 Id. at 297, 29098.
148 Id. at 29798.
149 For an argument along similar linesapropos of affirmative action specificallysee
Rubenfeld, supra note 104, at 471 ([I]nstitutions with affirmative action plans should be
open about them or scrap them. If the burdens that an honest affirmative action program
imposes on its beneficiaries are too great to bear, the correct response is not to prevaricate,
but to try something new.).
150 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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are doing it.151 On top of the seeming dishonesty that comes from bifurcating labels
and substance, the bigger problem is that the anti-balkanization view emphasizes the
wrong variable of the two. If Justice Souters point is that laws labels ought to track
its substance, there is another point to be made here: to the extent that laws labels do
not track its substance, jurisprudence should focus on the latter, not the former.
Ultimately, then, the point is not that racial labels are constitutionally irrelevant,
just that they should not drive the analysis. It may be that racial labels are troubling
insofar as they bespeak, in the words of Chief Justice Roberts, a sordid effort on the
part of state officials to divvy[ ] us up by race.152 In other words, it might be that
racial labels are heuristically meaningful, because they call attention to impermissible
state action. And of course it is also possible that racial labels are troubling because of
the functional effect they have. Racial labels, after all, are not like other labels. They
have an outsized capacityperhaps a unique capacityto harm, to terrorize, to reopen
old wounds. It is possible, therefore, that the basic insight of the anti-balkanization
view is correct, even if its remedy goes awry. Put simply, the presence of racial labels
in the law can work freestanding harm. Even when two laws have the exact same prac-
tical effect, it matters that one of them uses particular words and the other does not.
For constitutional analysis to proceed this way, a functional theory would be re-
quired; courts would need to develop criteria of harm, and to decide how, in practice,
such harm could be measured. There would be little reason to assumeas the anti-
balkanization view doesthat the harm of labels is necessarily more pronounced than
other harmful aspects of race-conscious laws, or more pronounced than the ongoing
harms which, given our social reality, persist in the absence of race-conscious laws.
What would be required, in other words, is a theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: the
outcomes it mandates, the outcomes it forbids, and what role racial labels have to play
in such analysis. Where the anti-balkanization view turns racial labels into taboos,
a functionalist approach would make them one variable among many: part of the
complex equation of race and equality in American society.
This is not an easy task. At some level, it may be an impossible task, for the very
thing that one camp understands equality norms to demandconsciously redressing
the past and present subordination of certain groupsis, for the other camp, pre-
cisely what equality norms forbid.153 But fixation on labels can be no substitute for
this labor.
CONCLUSION
The reality of interpretive practice is, at every moment, a threat to laws authority.
Considered at a high level of abstraction, the promise of judicial legitimacythat our
151 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 29798 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
153 See Fiss, supra note 106, passim (discussing the tension between individual- and
group-centric understandings of equal protection).
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bulwark against anarchy would be nothing sturdier than the interpretive proclivities
of older men and women who happen to wear robes and boast impressive resumes
verges on absurd. To an outsider, the arrangement no doubt seems implausible on its
face. Of course, this is how the legal system works and how it has always worked.
But the specter of chaos is always with us. It has captured our constitutional imagina-
tion since the founding era, and there is little reason to think it will abate.
The allure of labels is the allure of shorthand. Because they are rule-based and pre-
dictable, labels provideor seem to providea hedge against the perceived excess
of judicial will. In this respect, there is a kind of hidden symmetry between the two ex-
ceptions to functionalist interpretation traced in this Article. Clear statement rules con-
strain judicial authority by substituting the natural dynamics of interpretation with a
rigid determination about the presence of specific languagethe sort of determination
that could be made by a precocious schoolchild. Clear statement rules do this be-
cause, rightly or wrongly, they rest on the premise that judicial interpretation is not
to be trusted.
Race equality jurisprudence in generaland the anti-balkanization view in particu-
laralso seeks to constrain judicial authority. It endeavors to supplant the difficult
question of how constitutional law should contend with the shameful history of racial
subordination in the United States with an easy-to-execute test of words. In doing so,
the anti-balkanization view leads to an unorthodox sort of negative clear statement
rule, which, unlike normal clear statement rules, conditions state action on the absence
of specific words rather than their presence. The endgame, however, is the same. By
emphasizing the laws surface rather than its depth, by drawing inflexible lines, the
anti-balkanization view strips courts of interpretive authority. Instead of settling on a
principled view of what the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it ropes off a subset of
laws and policies (those that employ racial labels) as impermissible at the threshold,
irrespective of motivation or effect.154
There is something noble, and perhaps something tragic, in this celebration ofcom-
promise over consistency. The Ethos is one of diplomats and administrators, consum-
mate minimalists in our exuberantly minimalist age. Modest and spare, it is an ethos
oriented toward the negative: reducing friction, avoiding disappointment, minimizing
cost. Under its reign, Brown and Plessy would have been equally untenableindeed,
equallyunimaginable. For it is an ethos that knows neither triumph nor horror. It works
in fine, small strokes; it makes minor adjustments. And it seeks, most of all, to keep
things intact as they are.
154 The sense in which clear statement rules serve to occlude merits analysis has been noted
in other constitutional settings. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 96, at 157 (arguing, apropos of
Spending Clause cases, that clear statement rules constrict[ ] the reach of federal consti-
tutional norms, because they allow [f]ederal judges [to] use statutory interpretation as a
substitute for constitutional adjudication).
